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This paper presents two related models of development patterns of Chinese private 
enterprises. They illustrate incentive-based reasons for ownership arrangements of 
private enterprises, and highlight how institutional foundations of trust, particularly 
government and family-based cultural values, play an important role in influencing 
the development of private enterprises. These models attempt to explain why 
government and family-based culture are crucial for the ownership structure and 
management of private enterprises. The main argument in the models is that the 
structure of family businesses can be viewed, in essence, as a form of trust-sharing 
(Guanxi-sharing) arrangement within the firm. Furthermore, the increase in the 
prevalence of family businesses can be seen as a result of family trust replacing 
government trust in the firm’s economic activities. 
 
Key Words: Private enterprises in China, Guanxi, government and family trust, 
corporate governance. 
 






The rise of the private sector in China has attracted a lot of attention for the way in 
which it has fuelled rapid economic growth during the last three decades. Indeed, 
private enterprises in China are the most dynamic component of the Chinese economy, 
but the rapid development the private sector remains a puzzle: how could this happen 
despite the absence of well-defined private property rights? To answer this question, 
many have argued that standard property rights theory needs to incorporate social and 
cultural contexts (e.g. Weitzman and Xu, 1994; Xing, 1995; Smyth, 1997). This leads 
to an interesting research topic of interpreting the role of cultural values in the 
emergence of the private sector in China. Among such cultural influences, trust (or 
Guanxi in Chinese) is a very important issue.   
 
Guanxi is one of the major dynamics in Chinese society (Alston, 1989). The term 
Guanxi in the Chinese language is very loose, taking on multiple meanings, and it is 
generally viewed as networks of informal relationships and exchanges of favours that 
dominate business activity (Lovett et al., 1999; Li, 2002). According to Chiao (1982) 
and King (1991), factors that promote cooperation and shared social experience 
among individuals are considered as the core of Guanxi in Chinese society. Similarly, 
it is commonly accepted that trust provides a solid foundation for cooperation.  Given 
the implied cooperative characteristics, when discussing the business practices of 
Chinese private firms, Guanxi and trust are interchangeably used in much of the 
literature (e.g. Wank, 1996; Xin and Pearce, 1996; Li, 1998; Lovett et al., 1999; 
Schlevogt, 2001; Sun and Wong, 2002).  This paper also treats trust and Guanxi as 
synonymous terms. We use a general notion of trust, which has been frequently cited 
in recent literature (Williamson, 1993; Lorenz, 1999; James, 2002), to replace the 
notion of cooperative culture (Weitzman and Xu, 1994) to explain the development of 
Chinese private enterprises.  
 
In this paper, we mainly discuss Guanxi within a firm, and treat Guanxi as a non-
marked resource in the process of production. For the purpose of current research, 
Guanxi, or trust, can be understood as special connections and cooperation derived 
from government and family-based cultural values. In practice, the private 
entrepreneur typically pursues one of three cooperative arrangements: cooperation 
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with the government as a “red-hat”1 firm, cooperation with the family as a family 
business, or cooperation with both the government and family. The third type of 
cooperation can be seen in private enterprises in so called Zhejiang model, where 
many “red-hat” firms are also household enterprises. These three types of cooperation 
are in essence trust-sharing (Guanxi-sharing) arrangements. Although “red-hat” 
enterprises were prevalent from the beginning of the reform period to the late 1990s, 
there are almost no private enterprises registered as “red-hat” firms at present, while 
family businesses are still prevalent in China. This paper attempts to theoretically 
explain this phenomenon. 
 
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature 
on government and family trust. Section 3 presents the basic model and considers the 
determination of the optimal choice of ownership arrangements. Section 4 extends the 
model to explain the interplay between government and family trust in Chinese 
private enterprises. Conclusions follow in Section 5. 
 
2  Government vs family Guanxi 
Among the private firms in China, there are two types of prevalent Guanxi network.  
One is government Guanxi which refers to entrepreneurial ties with officialdom 
(Wank, 1996). In a complex political and economic environment like China, business 
people are motivated to cultivate Guanxi connections with government in order to 
access structural support (Xin and Pearce, 1996).   Government support is considered 
a major benefit that Chinese private firms might derive from their Guanxi activities 
(Davies et al. 1995). Although state patronage does not form part of the conventional 
theories on entrepreneurship, case studies of private enterprises in western China by 
Vicziany and Zhang (2004) show that political connections have been helpful for 
some of the most successful private entrepreneurs. Yang (1994) points out that since 
government officials are usually the most proficient guanxi practitioners themselves, 
they may serve as effective intermediaries which help to establish a larger Guanxi 
network. Sometimes, government Guanxi can also offer a protection role to private 
business (Redding, 1990). In addition, in an imperfect institutional environment such 
                                                
1 This can best be described as private firms put on a “hat” of collective ownership to adopt the appearance of 
being state or collective enterprises. The firm may appear to be “red” or collective from the top but in reality, at the 
grass roots, it is a private enterprise. 
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as China, where many exchange relationships are personalized and access to market 
information and scarce inputs is a matter of privilege, government Guanxi can be 
represented by procurement ability, which is essential for successful production (Tian, 
2000). 
 
Nevertheless, it is important to make a distinction between Government Guanxi and 
bribery activities, the central difference being that Guanxi refers to relationship 
building while bribery is simply an illicit transaction (Yang, 1994; Lovett et al., 1999). 
In other words, Guanxi places much more emphasis on human feelings, long-term 
obligations and bonding than the merely material interest exchanged, whereas with 
bribery and corruption, the social relationship is a means, not an end, of the exchange. 
Given this distinction, in this paper Guanxi is viewed in a positive fashion. We accept 
the distinction between Guanxi and bribery or corruption, and also the argument that 
Guanxi is productive (Wank, 1996). In particular, we see Guanxi as productive in 
providing transaction cost advantages in the transitional economy of China.  
 
Another type of Guanxi is family Guanxi, which refers to the trusting relationship 
between family members and friends. In China, family ties are substantially 
strengthened by Confucianism. One of the most distinctive features of Chinese 
societies is their family orientation. The kinship-based Guanxi is due to strong family 
identification and role obligation as defined and reinforced by social norms 
permeating Chinese societies (Bond and Hwang, 1986). In other words loyalty and 
related favouritism to family is an obligation, which justifies the dynamism of family 
business in China. Sun and Wong (2202) argue that trusting relationships between 
family members underpin the development of private enterprises. Notably, although 
family Guanxi is mostly family centred, it has an extraordinary capacity to extend 
beyond family members to friends and acquaintances (Sun and Wong, 2002). As a 
result, family Guanxi, like government Guanxi, can also be treated as an ability to 
obtain necessary inputs for successful production that cannot be readily acquired 
through ordinary market transactions. The important role played by family Guanxi is 
obviously reflected in the dominance of family businesses among Chinese private 
enterprises, as discussed above. 
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While both government and family Guanxi have played an important role in the 
development of Chinese private enterprises, differences between them can be located 
in terms of three important factors of trustworthiness: ability, benevolence, and 
integrity (Mayer et al., 1995; Lovett et al., 1999). The meaning of these three factors 
is somewhat elusive in the literature (Lovett et al., 1999). However, in simple terms, 
ability refers to competence and expertise, while benevolence refers to loyalty and 
altruism, and integrity refers to consistency and congruity (Mayer et al., 1995).  
 
In terms of ability, although family members have been a major source of cheap and 
flexible resources for private enterprises (Roberts and Zhou, 2000), their financial 
competence is limited compared with that of the government in accessing capital, in 
particular bank loans, which is critical to enterprise development (Sun and Wong, 
2002). In this manner, government trust can be interpreted as being at a higher level 
of ability than family trust. In terms of benevolence, although the government 
generally acts as a “helping hand” in market-oriented reforms (Li, 1998), this does not 
mean that government policy always gives priority to the long-term development of 
private enterprises (Sun and Wong, 2002). Rather, new regulations have often been 
accompanied by “rectification” campaigns, which have impeded private enterprise 
development (Gregory et al., 2000). Moreover, there is a tendency for the government 
to increase rent-seeking in successful enterprises (Sun, 2002; Yang, 2002). In contrast, 
it is generally accepted that family relationships represent loyalty and altruism simply 
because family members care more about each other than outsiders (Whyte, 1995; 
Schlevogt, 2001). In this manner, family trust is at a higher level of benevolence than 
government trust. In terms of integrity, it has been argued that private business was 
experimental during the reform periods (Gelb et al., 1993) and there was no effective 
mechanism to ensure that the government could not suddenly reverse the reform 
process or impose exactions on private enterprises (Li, 2004), while the success of 
family firms lies in the stability of the family system (James, 1999; Yeung, 2000). In 
this respect, family trust represents a higher level of integrity than government trust. 
To sum up, among the three aspects of trustworthiness, government trust generally 
represents a higher level of ability, while family trust generally represents a higher 
level of benevolence and integrity within private enterprises. These differences 
between government and family trust affect a firm’s decision to cooperate with the 
government or with the family. 
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More importantly, government and family Guanxi have different effects on corporate 
governance of private enterprises. Within a typical family business, control rights are 
in the hands of the owner, who is also the manager of the firm (Schlevogt, 2001). In 
other words, this kind of firm can be viewed as an owner-cum-manager firm (Fama 
and Jensen, 1983; James, 1999). Moreover, often the investor is also the owner of the 
firm. In this sense, the management of a family business is called “three roles in one” 
management (the investor, the owner, and the manager) or “four roles in one” (adding 
the producer) in some of the literature (Blue Book of Private Enterprises, 2001, 2002; 
Gan, 2002). In terms of corporate governance, a family business is characterized by 
non-separation of ownership and control. In contrast, the control rights within a “red-
hat” enterprise rest with both the manager and the government (Smyth, 1997; Hsiao et 
al., 1998), or the government only (Weitzman and Xu, 1994; Chang and Wang, 1994; 
Che and Qian, 1998). Consequently, the government shares the profits with investors 
(Pearce, 2001; Rao et al., 2005). However, the conflicts of objectives and interests 
between the firm and the government are obvious because local governments are not 
purely economic actors but pursue multiple social, political and economic objectives 
such as employment maximization (Bowles and Dong, 1999; Sun, 2002). As a 
consequence, private enterprises often go along with government interference, which 
often contradicts their interests (Sun and Wong, 2002). In fact, there is a tendency for 
local governments to misuse their ownership rights over TVEs and “red-hat” 
enterprises (Sun, 2002). In this manner, corporate governance in a “red-hat” enterprise 
can be interpreted as separation of ownership and control. The distinction between 
family and government Guanxi is the underpinning idea of our theoretical model. 
 
 
Despite all the empirical studies, there is hardly any work done to provide a 
theoretical explanation of government and family trust in the rise of the private 
enterprises in China.  One exception is the significant contribution made by Tian 
(2000), which could be a starting point. Tian (2000) developed a model based on 
Eswaran and Kotwal (1985) to discuss the nature of TVEs, in which there is a 
considerable involvement of the government. Tian considers both the institutional 
environment and the institutional arrangements, but focuses on the determination of 
the optimal choice of ownership arrangements by taking the institutional environment 
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as exogenous. He concludes that private ownership is the optimal property rights 
arrangement “based on a set of presumptions that may not be satisfied by transitional 
and other irregular economic environments, in which economic freedom is 
constrained and markets are absent, immature, or imperfect.” (Tian, 2000, pp.248-249) 
In short, Tian shows that collective ownership dominates private ownership in a 
transitional (and/or developing) economic environment, while private ownership 
dominates collective ownership in a developed economic environment. In Tian’s 
opinion, however, private ownership is the appropriate mechanism to achieve an 
efficient allocation of resources. Therefore, he concludes that privatization requires 
that the economic environment is improved first. 
 
Tian’s model fits well with the development of Chinese TVEs, especially given the 
gradual nature of privatization in China, particularly when TVEs are viewed as an 
intermediate form of “pure” private enterprise. Tian’s model can also be used to 
explain the phenomenon of “red-hat” firms within the context of the development of 
Chinese private enterprises. However, his model does not clearly explain the 
phenomenon of family businesses. As noted earlier, there are almost no private 
enterprises registered as “red-hat” firms in present-day China. This can be partially 
explained by improvements in the economic environment, but more importantly, by 
the increasing importance of family trust relative to government trust in the economic 
activities of firms. The reason behind this argument is that the economic environment 
in present-day China is still generally accepted as immature. Therefore, we extend 
Tian’s model to provide an explanation for this feature of the development of Chinese 
private enterprises in the following sections.  
 
Our model differs from Tian’s model in the following aspects. First, we discuss the 
optimal arrangement for Chinese private enterprises from the perspective of the agent 
who has superior management ability. In contrast, Tian discusses the optimal 
ownership in terms of social welfare that consists of the expected incomes of both the 
private entrepreneur and the government. Second, we use a more general notion of 
trust and attempt to distinguish the role of government from that of the family, while 
Tian considers only the role played by the government. In our model, there is a 
distinction between the manner in which family and government trust enter the firm’s 
economic activities. In particular, the use of government trust gives rise to separation 
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of ownership and control, but the use of family trust does not. Third, we go beyond 
Tian’s model. Since our model is more general, we can derive Tian’s theorems and 
conclusions, which are presented in our first proposition. More importantly, our 
models give new results, in particular, those that explain the interplay of government 
and family trust, thus providing an explanation for the prevalence of family 
businesses in China. 
 
3 The Basic Model 
Based on Tian’s (2000) framework, we develop a general model for private 
enterprises, and introduce both government and family trust (Guanxi) into the firm’s 
economic activities to examine the interplay of the two types of trust and its effects on 
the equilibrium ownership structure. 
 
3.1 Assumptions and foundations 
In order to capture the role of government and family Guanxi, it requires that non-
marketed resources are considered to be inputs in the production process. The idea of 
non-marked resources has been already used for various studies (e.g. Reid, 1977; 
Eswaran and Kotwal,1985; Tian 2000). We focus on two specific non-marketed 
resources: management ability and Guanxi ability. These two abilities constitute the 
core of private enterprise management, and they are crucial for successful production 
in a developing market such as China.2 
 
Consider two agents: Agent 1 is a private entrepreneur (or investor) with superior 
management ability, M, while Agent 2 processes superior Guanxi ability, G. Agent 1 
can establish a firm by choosing one of two organizational forms. In one 
organizational form, he runs the firm solely by himself, i.e., there is a non-cooperative 
arrangement, and in the other, he runs the firmly jointly with Agent 2, i.e., there is a 
cooperative arrangement.   
 
We assume that effective production in imperfect markets uses three types of 
resources: capital investment, management ability M, and Guanxi ability G. The profit 
from the investment for given M and G can be denoted by a function, П(M, G; ! ), 
                                                
2 We do not attempt to measure the degree of market imperfection in China in this paper. 
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which is assumed to be increasing, continuous, and concave in its first two arguments. 
In this function, ! , with 0 1!" " , is used to denote the degree of market perfection. 
Increasing !  implies that the market environment is becoming more transparent.  
Likewise, the importance of Guanxi ability is considered to decrease as the degree of 
market perfection increases. Capital investment k , which is another input resource 
and can be made solely or jointly by the two agents, is assumed to take the value of 1 
without loss of generality. Both management and Guanxi activity are time-consuming 
processes, and time devoted can be used as a proxy for management input and Guanxi 
input. We assume that both the agents have one unit of time that can be allocated 
between production and alternative activities, and uses λ to denote the Guanxi ability 
of the agent 1. Due to different endowment advantages, we assume that one hour of 
the agent 1’s time devoted to Guanxi is equivalent to only a fraction λ of one hour 
devoted by the agent 2 who has superior Guanxi ability. Thus, 0 1!< < . As the 
model is focused on economic profit, opportunity income (denoted u) is taken into 
account.  The income from alternative activities of the agent 1 (opportunity income) is 
given by 
1
u  and that of the agent 2 is given by 
2
u
3. All opportunity incomes are 
assumed to be exogenous. 
 
In order to explicitly solve the above model by the differentiation approach, we 
restrict the conditional profit function to be some specific function form. Especially, 
we have to address the issue of incorporating both government and family Guanxi 
into our model.  To accommodate the profit function, G is assumed to take a CES 
(constant elasticity of substitution) form as 1/( )g fG G G
! ! != + , where gG  is 
government Guanxi and is family Guanxi, with 0 , 1g fG G! ! , 1g fG G+ ! , and 
0 1!< < .  The introduction of fG  is a key feature that distinguishes our model from 
that of Tian (2000). Under this assumption, government and family Guanxi can take 
the value of zero separately, but they cannot be zero simultaneously. When 0gG =  or 
0fG = , it indicates that Agent 1 or 2 has only family or government Guanxi, 
respectively. When 0 , 1g fG G< < , Agent 1 or 2 has both family and government 
Guanxi. These correspond to cooperation with family only, or government only, or 
                                                
3 Note that here and elsewhere in this paper, quantities subscripted by 1 refer to Agent 1, and quantities subscripted 
by 2 refer to Agent 2. 
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both, respectively. In this model, the latter case is a general one while the others are 
the special cases described in Tian’s (2000) model.   
 
Given technology and price for simplicity, the profit function is assumed to take a 
Cobb-Douglas form as 
 (1) 1 2(1 ) /( )g fM G G
! " ! ## # $% = + , where 
1 2
, 0,! ! >  and 
1 2
1! !+ < . 
In the above function the relative importance of capital input can be denoted 
as
3 1 2
1! ! != " " . 
 
In the following section, we explicitly solve the model presented above for this Cobb-
Douglas specification. The important findings are of this paper will be derived by 
comparison and cross comparison of the static results.   
 
3.2 Arrangement choices and solutions 
We first consider the general case, i.e., cooperation with both government and family 
Guanxi.  
 
3.2.1 Non-cooperative arrangement 
Under this type of arrangement, Agent 1 runs the firm solely, makes one unit of 
capital investment, hires unskilled labour and allocates his time between management, 
Guanxi, and his alternative activity such as being employed by another employer or 
just enjoying leisure time in order to maximize his expected income. That is, with the 
profit function given by (1), Agent 1’s income maximization problem becomes 
(2) ( ) ( ) ( )2 21
1 1 1
1 1 /





g f g f
M G G
M G G M G G u
! " ! " #" # #$ % %& '( = + + % % %) * , 
where 
1 1 1


































1g fM G G+ + < , the interior solution is given by 
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(4) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )2 1 1 2
2 1 1
1
1 1 1 1
1 1* * 1
1 1 1 1 1 2[ 1 ] 2
s s
g fG G u
! " # " " ! "
! " " " #$ " ! "
% % % % % %
% %%

















Substituting (4) into (2), the expected income of Agent 1 is 
(5) 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ){ } ( )




1 2 1 2
1/ 1 1
11 1 1 /
1 1 2 1 1 2
1 / 1 1
1 1




! " !" !" ! " ! # #!
! " ! ! " !
! " ! $ ! " !
% % %& '( )%% % %
% + % % % %& ' & '( ) ( )





3.2.2 Cooperative arrangement 
Under this arrangement, Agent 1 and Agent 2 run the firm jointly, and each of them 
receives their share of the residual income. We assume that they share the profit 
according to some given ratio, which depends on the bargaining power of each agent. 
Recall that 0 1!" "  is the profit share of Agent 1, then the net income of Agent 1 is 
given by 
(6) ( ) ( )21
1
1 /




M G G M u
! " #" # #$ %& '( = + + %) * ,  
where 
1
0 1M! ! , 
2 2
0 , 1g fG G! ! , and 2 2 1g fG G+ ! , . 
 
Solving this problem, Agent 1’s reaction function is 
(7) ( ) 2 1
1
1 /1 1
1 1 1 2 2min 1, ( )g fM G Gu
! " ## # "$" %% %
& '( () *= ++ ,- .( (/ 0
. 
 
Similarly, Agent 2’s income maximization problem in is 
(8) ( ) ( ) ( )21
2 2
1 /
2 1 2 2 2 2 2
,
max 1 ( ) 1
g f
c
g f g f
G G
M G G G G u
! " #" # #$ %& '( = % + + % %) * ,  
where 
2 2
0 , 1g fG G! ! , and 2 2 1g fG G+ ! . 
 
Solving this problem for an interior solution, Agent 2’s reaction function is 
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(9) ( ) ( )






2 2 2 1 2
min 1, 1 1 2g fG G Mu
! " ! "
" #$ ! "
% % %%
%
& '( )* *= = % %+ ,- .
+ ,* */ 01 2
. 
 
Following the approach of Eswaran and Kotwal (1985) and Tian (2000), we assume 
that there is an interior Nash equilibrium. The interior solution is given by 
 
(10) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )














! " " ! "
! "! " ! " # # ! "" $ $
"
% % % %
%% % % %%
& '%( )* *= %+ ,- .
/ 0* *1 2
, 












= = . 
 
Finally, also following the approach of Eswaran and Kotwal (1985), for a given share 
! , Agent 1 will set a level of Agent 2’s remuneration that holds Agent 2 at (or barely 
above) his opportunity income. In other words, Agent 1’s expected income is the joint 
profit of both Agent 1 and Agent 2, less the opportunity income of Agent 2, becoming 
 (11) 
( ) ( )
( )( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ){ } ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
21
2 1 22 21 1
1 1 2 2 1 2
1 /* * * * * *
1 1 2 1 1 2 2 22 2
1
1 1 11 1 1 /
1 2 1 2
/ 1 1 1 / 1 1
1 2 1
( ) [( ) ( ) ] 1 (1 )
1 1 1 1 1 2
.
c c c c c c c
g gf fM G G M G Gu u u
u u u
! " #" # #
! " " ! "! " ! " # #" "
" " ! " ! " " ! "
$" $ ! " $ $ " ! "
% & % &' ( ' (
)
) ) ) )) ) )
) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) )
% & % &' ( ' (
* = + + ) + ) ) )




3.3 Special cases 
In practice, a private firm can choose to cooperate with government only or family 
only instead of with both government and family; that is, the private firm may use 
only one type of Guanxi input for production, i.e., 0fG = , or 0gG = . These are 
special cases of our general model, with Tian’s (2000) model the special case where 
0fG = . In our general model, Agent 2 has superior ability with respect to both family 
and government Guanxi. In these special cases, Agent 2 has only one type of superior 
Guanxi ability. We consider these special cases below. 
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3.3.1 Non-cooperative arrangement 
The calculation approach is the same as before but simpler. Under the non-
cooperative arrangement, we first consider the case when Agent 1 has only family 
Guanxi, i.e., 
1
0gG = . With the profit function given by (1), Agent 1’s income 
maximization problem in (2) becomes 
(12) ( ) 21 2
1 1
1 (1 )'







M G M G u
! "" ! "# $ $% &' = + $ $( ) ,  
where 
1 1



































1fM G+ < , the interior solution is given by 
(14) ( ) ( ) ( )











! ! " !




% &' () )= $* +, -$. /) )0 1















Substituting (14) into (12), Agent 1’s expected income is 
(15) 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ){ } ( )




1 2 1 2
1/ 1 1
11'
1 1 2 1 2






! " !" !" ! !
! " ! ! " !
! " ! # ! " !
$ %& '
$ % $ %& ' & '
( ( (((
( + ( ( ( (




In the alternative scenario where 
1
0fG = , Agent 1 has only government Guanxi, and 
the result is almost the same as that when 
1
0gG = , except that 1 fG  is replaced by 1gG . 
Therefore, Agent 1’s expected income is the same as in (15). These two cases are 
extreme cases of the non-cooperative arrangement. 
 
3.3.2 Cooperative arrangement 
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Under this arrangement, we first consider the case when Agent 2 has only family 
Guanxi, i.e., 
2
0gG = . With the profit function given by (1), Agent 1’s income 
maximization problem in (6) becomes 
(16) ( ) ( )21
1
1'





M G M u
! ""# $% &' = + $( ) , where 10 1M! ! . 
 
Solving this problem, Agent 1’s reaction function is 
(17) ( )
( ){ }12 1/ 1111 1 1 2min 1, fM Gu !" !# ! $$$% &= ' ( . 
 
Similarly, Agent 2’s income maximization problem in (8) is  
(18) ( ) ( ) ( )21
2
1'






M G G u
! ""# $% &' = $ + $( ) , where 20 1fG! ! . 
 
Solving this problem, Agent 2’s reaction function is 
(19) ( ) ( ) ( ){ }21 1/ 1 112 2 2 1min 1, 1 1fG Mu ! ""# ! " $ $% &' ($% &= $ $' ( . 
 
Also assuming an interior solution and solving (17) and (19) for an interior Nash 
equilibrium, we have 
(20) ( ) ( )( ) ( )














! " !" !
" !" ! " !! # #
!
$ $ $% &' ($
$$ $$
) *$% &+ += $, -. /
' (+ +0 1
,  















Finally, Agent 1’s expected income is the joint profit of both Agent 1 and Agent 2, 
less the opportunity income of Agent 2, i.e., 
(21) 
( )( ) ( )
( )( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ){ } ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
2
1
22 1 21 1
1 1 2 2 1 2
1
' '* '* '* '*
1 1 2 1 1 2 2 2
1
11 1 1
1 2 1 2
/ 1 1 1 / 1 1
1 2 1
( ) 1 (1 )
1 1 1 1 1
.
c c c c c
f fM G M Gu u u
u u u
! ""
! "! " " ! "" "
" " ! " ! " " ! "
#" # ! " # # " ! "
$
$$ $ $ $
$ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $% & % &' ( ' (
) = + $ + $ $






In the alternative scenario where 
2
0fG = , Agent 2 has only government Guanxi, and 
the result is almost the same as 
2
0gG = , except that 2 fG  is replaced by 2gG . 
Therefore, Agent 1’s expected income is the same as in (21). These two cases are 
extreme cases of the cooperative arrangement. 
 
3.4 Optimal arrangement 
Having determined Agent 1’s expected income under the non-cooperative and 
cooperative arrangements, the optimal arrangement will be given by the one that 
maximizes his expected income. We consider only the interior solution cases, 




3.4.1 General optimum 
Proposition 1. For a profit-maximizing private firm, the non-cooperative 
arrangement dominates the cooperative arrangement when the economic (market) 
environment is close to perfect. On the other hand, the cooperative arrangement 
dominates the non-cooperative arrangement in a transitional and/or developing 
economic environment. 
 
Comparing (5) with (11), i.e., Agent 1’s expected income under the non-cooperative 
and cooperative arrangements, we have 
(22)
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The comparison of special cases between (15) and (21) is almost the same as (22) 
except it does not include the term ( ) ( )21 1 /2 ! " # #! !  (which is positive and larger than 1) 
in the first brace. This implies that cooperation with both the government and family 
Guanxi is better than cooperation with only one type of Guanxi, as will be discussed 




s c! > !  when ρ is close to 1 while 
1 1
s c! < !  when ρ is small enough (see Tian 
(2000), pp.260-261). This result means that the non-cooperative arrangement 
dominates the cooperative arrangement when the quality of the economic 
environment is sufficiently high, and vice versa. In this model, the critical value of 
economic environment quality is  






















% & '% % % %( )= % * +, - % % %. / 0 1
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That is, when 
1
,! !"  Agent 1 will choose the cooperative arrangement for profit 
maximization instead of the non-cooperative arrangement. The turning point in this 
model at which the cooperative arrangement switches to the non-cooperative 
arrangement is ! .4 
 
The above optimal solutions for the non-cooperative arrangement and the cooperative 
arrangement mean that the development pattern of private enterprises is endogenously 
determined, which will be further explored by Proposition 2. In other words, the 
optimal choice of arrangement is an efficient response to the economic environment. 
When the quality of the economic environment is low, the cooperative arrangement is 
optimal, i.e., the use of Guanxi ability is important and necessary for efficient 
production. On the other hand, when the quality of the economic environment is high, 
Guanxi ability is not a necessary input for production because production can be 
carried out with management and other marketed resources without Guanxi. This 
conclusion does not contradict standard theories, but rather extends them to take into 
account the role of the institutional environment.  
 
3.4.2 Local optimum for the cooperation 
We now focus on the cooperative arrangement of Chinese private enterprises since the 
economic environment in China is commonly characterized as developing or 
transitional.  
 
                                                
4 The critical value of ! is the same as in Tian’s (2000) model since this model is an extension of his model.  
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Proposition 2. Given the Cobb-Douglas technology specified in (1), the ownership 
structure of private enterprises endogenously chosen in a developing economic 
environment is the cooperative arrangement. 
 
Under the cooperative arrangement, when the economic environment is imperfect to 
some degree and Guanxi ability is relatively more important than management ability, 
an optimal share ! * can be chosen endogenously in a way that maximizes Agent 1’s 
expected income 
1




c!  with respect to ! , and set it equal to zero. The first-order condition 
is 
(24) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )21 2 1 2 1 21 2 1 1 1 1 0f ! " # " ! " # " ! " # "= $ $ $ $ $ + $ $ =% & % & % &' ( ' ( ' ( . 
 
When! =0, ( ) ( )1 20 1 1f ! " != # #$ %& ' >0, and when! =1, ( ) ( ) ( )2 11 1 1 0f ! " "= # # < . 
Thus, there is some 0<! *<1 such that ( )* 0f ! = . Solving this problem, we have the 
optimal share ! *, which is given by 
(25) 
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Orthodox endogenous ownership theory suggests that ownership structure is 
endogenously determined in equilibrium, which means that the market responds to 
forces that create suitable ownership structures for firms. However, it restricts the 
endogenous ownership structure as the outcome of a perfect market. Therefore, some 
scholars argue that this theory is not applicable to the situation in China. In our model, 
however, the optimal share ! * depends on the relative importance of management 
ability 
1
!  and Guanxi ability 
2
! , as well as the degree of market perfection ! . If we 
regard the share !  or (1-! ) as the residual right of claim, one important element of 
property rights, our model shows that the division of property rights allows people the 
option of combining “ownership” and control in any mixture that they wish, subject to 
their budget. Faced with such a situation, the private entrepreneur (Agent 1) can 
choose Guanxi-sharing (trust-sharing) cooperation with Agent 2, either with the 
                                                
5 The same result can be obtained by solving (21) for the special cases—cooperation with government only or with 
family only. 
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government or the family, or with both. In short, Proposition 2 is complementary to 
and more specific than Proposition 1. 
  
Proposition 3. Under the cooperative arrangement and given the Cobb-Douglas 
technology specified in (1), the optimal share of Agent 1 (management ability) 
increases as the economic environment becomes more regular. 
 
Differentiating (25) with respect to ρ, we have 
(26) 
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Considering the term in the brace, which is equal to 
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> , which means that ! * increases as ρ increases.  
 
In other words, as the market environment improves, the optimal ownership share 
tends to be concentrated in the hands of management, no matter what kind of 
cooperative arrangement Agent 1 chooses cooperation with either the government or 
the family, or with both. This reflects the dynamic process of the development of 
private enterprises, and it is consistent with the tendency of many employee-joint-
stock cooperatives in Wenzhou City, Zhejiang province, where share-concentration 
has continued to increase in the hands of the core shareholders, i.e., mainly core 
managers (Sun, 2000). 
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3.5 Ownership structure and management 
3.5.1 Emergence of diffuse ownership structure 
The above model shows that trust (Guanxi) is an important resource in a firm’s 
production process, and it is better for a private entrepreneur to choose cooperation 
with Guanxi ability in an imperfect market, either government trust, or family trust, or 
both. Under the assumption of symmetry between government and family Guanxi in 
the CES specification, it is easy to show that the optimal allocation between 
government and family Guanxi is * *g fG G! ; that is, government and family Guanxi are 
equally important. In addition, the profit of a private firm choosing only government 
Guanxi for cooperation is the same as that of choosing only family Guanxi for 
cooperation (see Section 3.3). Despite the differences between the green field private 
enterprises and TVEs, this may be a possible explanation for the argument made by 
many scholars that the efficiency of Chinese TVEs, in which the government plays an 
important role, is (at least) the same as that of private enterprises (Weitzman and Xu, 
1994; Chang and Wang, 1994; Smyth, 1997, 1998, 2002).  
 
Furthermore, the model also shows that when Agent 1 chooses both government and 
family Guanxi abilities for cooperation simultaneously, his expected income is bigger 
than that when choosing only one type of Guanxi ability for cooperation. To see this, 
comparing (11) of the general case and (21) of the special case under the cooperative 
arrangement, the difference between Agent 1’s expected income is  
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In other words, it seems better for a private entrepreneur to choose both Guanxi 
abilities for cooperation, although they are substitutes for each other. In practice a 
firm will seek help from the government even though it is a family business. This 
happens in cases when a private enterprise is not only a family business, but also has 
family members working in or connected to the government. It seems that such firms 
will be more successful than a “pure” family business, which has been the case in the 
Wenzhou model (Sun, 2000). Moreover, when we view Guanxi ability as allocated by 
many different agents, diffuse ownership (share !  of profit) seems to be inevitable, 
which is consistent with the existence of a diffuse ownership structure in many 
Zhejiang private enterprises in recent times. In short, in the above model the objective 
function is to maximize the whole profit of the firm, and the model predicts an 
increase in the number of private enterprises with a diffuse ownership arrangement. 
 
3.5.2 Combination of endogenous ownership theory and agency theory 
The property rights theory developed in the above model is an endogenous ownership 
theory which attempts to include the role of the institutional environment. In 
particular, the optimal ownership structure is related to the degree of imperfection of 
the economic environment (Propositions 1 and 2) as well as management ability 
(Proposition 3). It can be argued that there is a conflict between endogenous 
ownership theory and agency theory, because orthodox endogenous ownership theory 
implies that it does not matter whether ownership is in the hands of management, 
while agency theory argues that ownership is better in the hands of management. In 
our opinion, this does not represent a contradiction because what endogenous 
ownership theory emphasizes is the role of “market discipline,” i.e., the role of the 
economic environment. This is also the reason why Tian (2000) argues that improving 
the economic environment first is the appropriate procedure for privatization in 
transitional economies. 
 
To sum up, the above model represents a combination of endogenous ownership 
theory and agency theory.7 That is, the optimal ownership of a firm depends on not 
only the economic environment, but also the role of management. From the 
                                                
7 Of course, endogenous ownership theory and agency theory are, in essence, not contradictory. However, we 
emphasize their differences here. 
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perspective of the whole economy, the optimal ownership structure is determined by 
the market, while from the view of individual firms, ownership is better assigned to 
the agent with management ability when the economic environment improves. 
Therefore, the model developed here not only extends endogenous ownership theory 
to include an immature market, but also combines it with agency theory. 
 
4 Why a Family Business Does Not Need Government Trust 
The above model does not clearly explain the interplay between government and 
family trust. Therefore, in this section we present an additional but related model, 
showing that the interplay between government and family trust leads private 
enterprises to cooperate with family members in a developing or transitional market. 
In the following model we further consider the important role played by management 
in private enterprises, in which the manager maximizes the profit of family members 
instead of that of the whole firm. We show that a family business may not need to 
cooperate with the government.  
 
4.1 A cooperative model of family business with the government 
As explained earlier, the development pattern of Chinese private enterprises is 
primarily characterized by family businesses. This is true no matter whether they take 
the form of “pure” private firms or “red-hat” firms, and the estimation that family 
businesses account for 90% of all private enterprises is based on the broad definition 
of family business. In this section we define family business in a broad way, including 
solely-run, family-run, and family-holding private enterprises. This differs from the 
narrowly defined family business of the previous model in Section 3, but it 
corresponds to the definition adopted in most research in the literature (see, for 
example, Chandler, 1990; James, 1999; Gan, 2002). Therefore, the problem of 
cooperation with both government and family Guanxi by a private entrepreneur in the 
previous model becomes only a problem of cooperation with the government by a 
family business in this model. That is, the firm here has already cooperated with 
family Guanxi. However, the conclusions discussed in the previous model are used in 
this section, particularly the necessary input of Guanxi ability for the production 
process and specific firm profits. 
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4.1.1 The assumptions 
We assume a broadly defined family business; that is, the firm has been using 
available family Guanxi ability fG . Now suppose that there exists a profitable project, 
which requires further cooperation with government Guanxi ability gG . The 
opportunity evaporates if the firm does not go ahead, that is, the delay of further 
cooperation reduces the project’s profit. The required Guanxi can be realized only by 
cooperation with government Guanxi ability gG . The question of whether this family 
firm cooperate with government now simply becomes whether to undertake the 
project. 
 
We further assume that government Guanxi gG  is available and can be voluntarily 
obtained by a firm, so that the obtained government Guanxi 0,gK >  can be viewed as 
the monetary value of government Guanxi. This makes sense when we treat Guanxi as 
an intangible asset, which is similar to “reputation capital” described by Smyth (1997). 
Thus, the value of the firm increases when government Guanxi is incorporated. We 
also assume that the value of the firm’s share equals their expected future profits 
conditional on whatever information the market has. Two types of profits are involved 
here: that of the original family business and that of the project.  The profit of the 
family business may follow a distribution of 
0
!% , which represents the possible 
updated profit at a future date. The realization of 
0
!%  is denoted 
0
! .  The project 
profit follows a distribution of 
p
!% , and 
p




We assume that both 
0
!  and 
p
!  are positive. This makes sense for the original profit 
because it is better to use Guanxi ability in an imperfect market, as seen in Proposition 
1 of the previous model, and the firm here has used available family Guanxi as a 
broadly defined family business. It makes sense for the project opportunity because 
the project is definitely discarded if it turns out to have a negative profit. 
 
Moreover, management is assumed to act in the interests of family members, i.e. the 
“old” owners before the start of project (Myers and Majluf, 1984; Myers, 2001). This 
is reasonable because a family business is viewed as an owner-cum-manager firm 
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(Fama and Jensen, 1983; James, 1999). Thus, the manager maximizes 
0( , , )f p gV V K! != , the “intrinsic” profit of family owners conditional on the project-




! . However, the true profit 




!% , whether the project has commenced and gets a share of the realized 
future profit due to asymmetric information. If the project is not undertaken, the 
family owners retain the total profit of the family business, 
0
! .  If the project is 
undertaken, the family owners only get a share of the total profit, '! , the remaining 
goes to the government. 
 
 
4.1.2 The model analysis 
If the firm (family business), knowing the profit 
0
!  and the profit share '! , does not 
undertake the project, it forfeits the opportunity, so 













. Family owners are better off  if the firm chooses 



























, which means that the share of existing profits going 
to the government is no more than the share of the increment to firm profits obtained 
by family owners. The condition can also be written as:  
(28) ( ) 0/ 'g g pK K! ! !" + . 
 




!%  into two regions, as shown in Figure 1.  
 
INSERT FIGURE 1 
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At this stage, if the actual outcome ( )0 , p! !  falls in region N’, the firm undertakes the 
project, i.e., further cooperation with the government. If the outcome falls in region N, 
the firm does nothing: it is willing to give up the profit of its investment opportunity 
rather than undertake the project for less than the share that it is really worth. Note 




!%  is restricted to the northeast 
quadrant of Figure 1. Region N’ is at the top left of this quadrant. The firm is most 
likely to undertake the project when 
p
! , the realization of project profit, is high and 
0
! , the original profit of the family business, is low. The lower 
0
!  is, the more 
attractive the project share of profit '! . 
 
However, this is not the end of the story. Although further cooperation with the 
government increases the whole profit of a family firm, the family’s share of profit 
cannot increase simultaneously with the whole profit of the firm, especially the profit 
created by government Guanxi. 8  Instead, it can only be obtained through the 
realization of project profit, and part of this profit has to go to the government. 
Therefore, the profit of family owners fV  cannot be larger than the total profit 
0 p








! ! ! ! !
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! ! !" # + . 
 
This indicates that the project profit should be bigger than or equal to the net gains 
obtained by a family business after further cooperation with the government, since 




! ! != " +  further divides region N’ into two regions, and converts the joint 




!%  into three regions, as shown in Figure 1. 
 
4.1.3 When not undertaking the project 
The direct result implied by the model is that the family firm may pass up good 
opportunities rather than cooperating with the government to undertake the project. 
                                                
8 Needless to say, in many cases a family firm has to pay the costs before cooperating with the government. 
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Assuming that region N is not empty, i.e., there is some probability of not undertaking 
the project, then Figure 1 shows that all realizations of 
0
!  which fall in region N 
exceed '! , i.e., 
0
'! !> .  
 
Put another way, the reason a family firm decides not to undertake the project is that 
( )0 ' 1 /p gK! ! !> + , which follows from reversing and rearranging (28). Since 
/ 0p gK! " , the decision not to undertake the project signals 0 '! !> . In other words, 
it signals that the true profit of family owners exceeds '! , the profit of family share if 
the project is undertaken. Since 
0
!  must exceed '! , then the true profit must fall if 
the firm decides to undertake the project. 
 




! ! != " +  makes the previous region N’ smaller by region n 
due to the constraint of (29). Thus region n can be interpreted as an additional region 
N, which is also a region where the project is not undertaken. In summary, region N’ 




! ! != " +  is the region of undertaking the project, while region N 
and region n are the regions where the project is not undertaken. 
 
Note that both 
0
!  and 
p
!  incorporate all information available to investors. They are 
rationally-formed, unbiased estimates of the intrinsic profit of the family firm. They 
reflect knowledge of the firm’s decision rule as well as its decision. 
0
!  exceeds '!  
because investors rationally interpret the decision not to undertake the project as good 
news about the true profit of the firm. The result is intuitive in the sense that the 
manager of a family business acts in the interests of family members, and that the 
manager maximizes the true profit of family owners. 
 
4.2 Turning back to the previous model 
Now we return to the previous model in Section 3, using the analysis of the 
cooperative model of family business with the government. The profits in the 
previous model are explicit, but specific; that is, the original profit of the family 
business is '
0 1
c! = " , as in (21), while the project profit of further cooperation with 




! = " #" = $ " , as in (27), which is positive, as 
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discussed before. However, we need further analysis of 
0
!  and 
p
!  to examine why a 
family business may not need to cooperate with government Guanxi, as proposed in 
the cooperative model in the previous section. 
 
4.2.1 The dynamic movements of ( )0 , p! !  from undertaking the project 
First, taking logarithms of both sides of (21) and differentiating 
0
ln!  with respect 
to ! , we have 
(30) 
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< , which means that the profit of the family business decreases as the 
degree of market perfection !  increases. In fact, 
0
0! "  when 1! " . 
 
Similarly, taking the logarithms of both sides of (27) and differentiating ln
p
!  with 
respect to ! , we have 
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< , i.e. the project profit also decreases as !  increases. Also 
0
p
! "  when 1! " . 
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Therefore, the dynamic movements of outcome ( )0 , p! !  from undertaking the project, 
i.e., cooperation between the family business and government Guanxi, are shown in 
Figure 2. The original outcome ( )0 , p! !  falls in region N’, it moves left and 
downwards towards the origin as !  increases, and finally falls in region n. This result 
implies that when the market environment improves, the family business will not 
choose further cooperation with the government. This explains why no private firms 
are registered as “red-hat” firms in present-day China. However, the private 
entrepreneur still chooses cooperation with family at this stage in the model. 
 
INSERT FIGURE 2 
 
Summarizing the above analysis, we then have the following proposition: 
 
Proposition 4. When the manager acts in the interests of family, the family business 
may forgo good projects rather than cooperating with the government to implement 
them. Moreover, previous cooperation with the government will also be given up by 
“pure” family business when the economic environment improves. 
 
As argued by Lorenz (1999), there is no guarantee that cooperation will succeed, even 
when the circumstances appear to promise mutual gain. Proposition 4 not only 
confirms this argument, but further shows that previous cooperation with government 
trust (Guanxi) will fade as the market environment improves.  
 
4.2.2 The decrease in cooperative profits 
Furthermore, taking logarithms of both sides of (11), i.e., the profit of cooperation 
with both government and family Guanxi, and differentiating 
1
ln
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Then comparing (32) and (30), which have similar structures, the second term in the 
brace of (32) is negative because 
1























In other words, the percentage change in 
1
c!  is bigger than the percentage change in 
'
1
c! , which means 
1
c!  decreases faster than '
1
c! . That is, the profit from cooperation 
with both government and family decreases faster than that from cooperation with 
only family when the economic environment improves. The rapid decrease in the 
profit from cooperation with the government seems to be the direct result of 
“mechanism degeneration” as described by Sun (2002),9 so that a family business will 
forgo cooperation with government Guanxi. 
 
4.3 Corollary of the theoretical models 
Some may argue that (21) also represents the profit of cooperation with the 
government only by the private entrepreneur, therefore, the above analysis is also 
valid for “red-hat” firms (or TVEs). That is, a “red-hat” firm (or a TVE) would 
continue to exist in China and would perhaps drive out family firms under a similar 
proposition. This argument may be true if the manager acts in the interests of existing 
owners (both the government and manager him or herself). However, it has been 
acknowledged that cooperation with the government typically entails a separation of 
ownership and control, where there is a conflict between the firm and the government. 
Given the agency problem, it is hard for the manager to act in the interests of both the 
government and him or herself. Thus, the analysis of the above cooperative model 
cannot be applied to a “red-hat” firm since the assumption that the manager acts in the 
interests of existing owners does not hold. 
  
In contrast, there is good reason to believe that the manager will act in the interests of 
family members. That is, the second model also provides a justification for the 
distinction between family and government Guanxi within a firm, which is the key 
                                                
9 “Mechanism degeneration” in Sun’s (2002) study refers to the trend whereby local governments shift from 
offering a “helping hand” to a “grabbing hand” and show a tendency to abuse their ownership rights over fake 
collectives. In Sun’s opinion, mechanism degeneration is an important reason for the fading out of local 
government ownership in Chinese TVEs. 
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underpinning idea of this paper. Combining the above analysis in this section with the 
discussion in Section 3, particularly Proposition 1, we reach the following corollary 
regarding the interaction of government and family Guanxi: 
 
 
Corollary: A private firm may prefer family trust (Guanxi) to government trust 
(Guanxi) for cooperation; that is, the prominence of family business can be explained 
by not only the improvement in the economic environment, but also the tendency for 
family trust (Guanxi) to replace government trust (Guanxi). 
 
5 Conclusion 
This paper represents the first attempt to model the roles of government and family 
together within the same social cultural framework of trust (Guanxi) for the private 
enterprises in China. The theory of ownership structure developed in the above 
models takes into account the effects of an imperfect institutional environment. The 
first model illustrates endogenous ownership theory in which the optimal arrangement, 
i.e., non-cooperative or cooperative arrangement with trust (Guanxi) for private 
enterprises, is related to the degree of imperfection of the market environment, as well 
as the ability of management in those firms. It explains how institutional foundations 
of trust, particularly the roles played by government and family, are crucial for the 
development of private enterprises. The first three propositions discuss the optimal 
arrangements for the development of private enterprise in an imperfect market such as 
China. These propositions hold for any ownership share, including the optimal share 
! *, which maximizes Agent 1’s expected income under the cooperative arrangement. 
The second model further confirms the importance of management in determining 
optimal ownership, but more importantly, it discusses the interplay of government and 
family Guanxi within the same configuration of general Guanxi ability in the 
production process. The last proposition and its corollary explain why family business 
is the most common ownership structure chosen by private enterprises and why direct 
involvement of the government in private businesses is fading out.  
 
The prevalence of family businesses can be seen as a result of family trust replacing 
government trust in the firm’s economic activities. The privatisation of the state-
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owned firms may not be the immediate procedure to reach an efficient allocation of 
resources, rather the economic environment should be improved first. Alternatively, 
promotion of green field private enterprises with pure private ownership is an 
appropriate mechanism. For family business, the advantages of family Guanxi 
obviously outweigh the disadvantages in present-day China. The future development 
of private enterprises depends heavily on the interplay of market forces, the role of 
government, and the evolutionary cultural context. In China, since government policy 
places increasing emphasis on building a market economy and shifts towards a rules-
based framework, the government is generally accepted as pro-reform and intends to 
cultivate a sound economic environment. Thus, when the market in China becomes 
more mature, private enterprises should adopt the appropriate form of ownership 
structure and corporate governance for changing circumstances. In the first model, the 
importance of family Guanxi ability will also finally be given up to “pure” 
management ability, as standard theories describe. However, the traditional cultural 
context seems to be not easily changed and family business may still exist into the 
future. At the same time, because family owners are not able to provide all the 
management skills themselves, except in the smallest firms (Gregory et al., 2000), the 
management decisions will also be surrendered to professional managers when the 
firm grows. Thus, family business will perhaps reflect a high probability of separation 
of ownership and control.  
 
In summary, the theoretical models developed in this paper represent a combination 
of orthodox endogenous ownership theory and agency theory. These models provide 
plausible explanations for the development pattern of Chinese private enterprises; 
however, there are certain caveats that are worth noting. For the first model, the 
assumption of only two classes and a single profit function inevitably leads to a single 
dominant arrangement. In addition, the model describes a one-period non-cooperative 
game, but typically cooperative patterns are of a long-run nature. The exercise under 
the assumption of a repeated cooperative game needs further analysis. For the second 
model, the analysis is also based on certain restricted assumptions such as the 
manager acting in the interests of existing owner(s) and passive outside investor(s). 
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Figure 2 The Dynamic Movements of Outcome ( )0 , p! !  as !  Increases 
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